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Introduction 
I take the purpose  of  this session to be to elicit views on economic 
policy from economists of  different points of  view.l  The particular title 
of the  session,  “Macroeconomic Policy,  1974/75 : What  Should Have 
Been  Done?”  does  not  seem  to me useful  for this  purpose,  as I will 
explain  below,  so  I will  adopt  a  somewhat  different  approach.  I will 
begin by stating a variation on the policy proposals advanced by Milton 
Friedman  in  “A Monetary  and  Fiscal Framework  for  Economic Sta- 
bility”  (1948)  and  A  Program for Monetary  Stability  (1959). After 
some speculations on why the Friedman program has had so limited an 
impact,2 I will identify and discuss some recent developments suggesting 
that its acceptance and influence may be greater in the near future. The 
paper concludes with an assessment of  the case for the Friedman pro- 
gram as it stands today, a brief discussion of  problems of  transition, and 
some concluding remarks. 
In centering the discussion around a proposal Friedman formulated, in 
its essentials, thirty years ago, I run an admitted risk of  locking myself  and 
others into positions we may have taken up years ago and not rethought 
seriously since. The alternative strategy of  repackaging this proposal in 
more  current  language  is  one I  find  distasteful,  and,  in  any  case,  it 
The  revision  has  benefitted from  the  suggestions of  Stanley  Fischer,  Milton 
1. EDITOR’S  NOTE:  Comments and discussion for chaps. 6 and 7 appear in chap. 7. 
2.  Of course, Friedman’s work in  general has had an enormous impact on many 
dimensions. I  am  here referring only  to  his recommendation that  monetary and 
fiscal policy be conducted according to fixed rules. 
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would quickly be found out. I will begin, then, on familiar ground and, 
for the most part, remain there. 
A set of  aggregative policies which would I believe, lead, and have 
led,  to  satisfactory general  economic  performance  are,  compactly de- 
scribed: 
1. A 4%  annual rate of growth of  M1, maintained as closely as pos- 
sible on a quarter-to-quarter  basis 
2.  A pattern of  real government expenditures and transfer payments, 
varying secularly but not in  response  to cyclical changes in  eco- 
nomic activity 
3. A pattern of  tax rates, also varying secularly but not in response to 
cyclical changes in  economic  activity,  set  to balance  the federal 
budget on average 
4. A clearly  announced policy that wage  and price  agreements  pri- 
vately  arrived  at  will  not  trigger  governmental  reactions  of  any 
kind  (aside from standard antitrust policies and the general policy 
of  government preference for low over high bids) 
The first three of  these policy rules are taken  directly from Friedman’s 
 writing^.^  The fourth is simply a recognition  of  the fact that, since the 
time Friedman’s proposals were originally formulated, intervention in the 
details of  private price  and wage negotiations has ceased to be viewed 
as an emergency measure so that  a position on the generally  accepted 
aspects of  aggregative policy cannot omit mention of  this fact. 
In restating these recommendations, I have tried to follow Friedman 
in being concrete and operational concerning exactly which policies are 
being advocated. Under the principle that natura non facit salturn, these 
particular policies must have neighbors that would have nearly the same 
consequences, and one would certainly like to have an analytical frame- 
work within which one could assess the consequences of  variations on 
them. The provision of  such a framework is far beyond the scope of  the 
present paper. I will proceed, instead, in  an entirely different direction: 
first by  recalling some of  the main features of  the intellectual environ- 
ment, both  within  and without  our profession,  into which  Friedman’s 
framework was introduced and then by tracing some of  the changes since 
in this environment. 
The Employment Act of  1946 
The dominant events influencing the minds of  the intended readers of 
Friedman’s  “Framework”  were the Great Depression  of  the  1930s and 
3.  Rules 2 and 3 are paraphrases of  those in Friedman  1948 (1953, pp.  136-37). 
Rule  1 is from Friedman  1959, pp. 87-92,  there presented  as  a desirable but sec- 
ond-best  alternative  to  the  requirement  of  100%  reserve  banking  advocated  in 
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the “prosperity”  (as measured  by  unemployment rates) of  the Second 
World War. It is difficult to imagine a sequence of  events that could more 
forcefully illustrate both the costs of  high unemployment and the ability 
of  government policy to affect unemployment. In all capitalist countries, 
this “lesson” had profound influences on policy. In the United States, it 
was embodied in the Employment Act of  1946. 
To some  contemporaries,  the Employment  Act  was  “a  weak  and 
meaningless wraith”  (Bailey  1950, p.  253), and in some respects it is 
easy to see why.  The  act granted  the executive no powers which had 
not been fully assumed during the New Deal period preceding, nor did it 
specify either the economic targets to be achieved or the policy tools to 
be utilized. The act did, however, require the executive in very explicit 
terms  to forecast the state of  the economy in the coming year  and to 
prescribe  policies designed to  alter this  state in  a  desirable direction. 
Moreover, it was clear in specifying exactly where the expertise required 
to carry out this task could be found: The Council of  Economic Advisors 
was established by the act as the channel by which this expertise could 
be brought to bear on practical policy. 
It would  be  a  difficult  and  subtle task  to  trace  the  effects  of  the 
Employment Act on the policy performance of  the U.S. government in 
the postwar years. There is nothing subtle, however, in the effects of  the 
act (or of  the events immediately preceding it) on the practice of  mone- 
tary  economics in  the postwar  period.  Renamed  macroeconomics, this 
subdiscipline defined itself  to be that body of  expertise the existence of 
which was  presupposed  in  the Employment Act,  and  its practitioners 
devoted themselves to the development and refinement of forecasting and 
policy evaluation  methods which  promised  to be of  use in  the  annual 
diagnosis-prescription exercise called for by the act. 
In many respects, the assumption of  this rather specific, applied role 
had  a very healthy effect on monetary  economics. The set of  common, 
agreed-upon  substantive objectives helped to unify the field and lent it 
a quantitative, operational character in sharp contrast with the literary, 
doctrinal  emphasis  of  so  much  prewar  monetary  and  business  cycle 
theory. A great number of  talented  scientists found this new character 
congenial. 
The highly productive, collective effort to make the Employment Act 
“work” was just getting underway when Friedman’s “Framework” was 
published in  1948. This was a proposal “concerned . . .  with structural 
reform [which] should not be urged on the public unless and until it has 
withstood the test of  professional criticism”  (Friedman 1948 [1953, p. 
1561). Perhaps this description may be taken as a comment on the haste 
with which Keynesian theory, at that time regarded as difficult and con- 
troversial,  understood  by  only a handful of  American  economists, had 
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scription of  the proposals  which  are,  implicitly,  a prediction  that the 
diagnosis and prescription process called for in the Employment Act can- 
not be made to work, given the level of  scientific understanding of  mone- 
tary dynamics at the time. The proposals are offered rather as a compro- 
mise, promising economic performance superior to that which had been 
observed  historically,  yet  promising  less  than  the  performance  goals 
which are implicit, if  vague, in the Employment Act.  They constituted, 
Friedman hoped, “a minimum program for which economists of  the less 
extreme shades of  opinion  can make common cause”  (Friedman  1948 
[1953, p. 1351). 
In retrospect,  it  is  clear  that  Friedman  underestimated  by  far the 
extent to which his colleagues were united in the belief that the Employ- 
ment Act,  together  with  the Federal  Reserve Act  as supplemented by 
changes  in  the  1930s,  provided  a  workable  policymaking  apparatus. 
Post-World  War I1 macroeconomics has shown little interest in reforms 
of  the  institutional  framework  within  which  economic  policy  is  con- 
ducted, and virtually no concern with formulating legislative guidelines 
or limits on monetary, fiscal, and now,  “incomes,”  policy.  The profes- 
sional  forum  for  debating  alternative  monetary  institutions  to  which 
Friedman addressed his proposals did not analyze them, consider them, 
reject them in favor of  others. It simply passed out of  existence. Instead, 
within  the  existing  institutional framework,  the  role  of  the  economic 
expert as day-to-day manager expanded rapidly, and the role of  the aca- 
demic  macroeconomist  became  that  of  equipping  these  experts  with 
ideas, principles, formulas which gave, or appeared to give, operational 
guidance on the tasks with which these economic managers happened to 
be faced. 
From the perspective of this new role for aggregative economics, the 
difficulty with the Friedman proposals was not so much that they were 
demonstrably  dominated by others, but that they were irrelevant. They 
speak to the  question:  Under  what  rules  of  the game,  remaining  pre- 
dictably in force over long periods, can we expect satisfactory economic 
performance? The economic manager responsible  for  advising on, say, 
the size of  the coming fiscal year deficit is  simply uninterested  in this 
question: it seems to him merely an academic exercise, unrelated to the 
tasks he has taken it upon himself to perform. 
On one level, this reaction to the Friedman proposals is understand- 
able. General economic performance in the twenty years following the 
passage of  the Employment Act was, by any historical standard, highly 
successful. It is not surprising, then, that there was little general discus- 
sion of  institutional  change during this period and that this lack of  in- 
terest was reflected in economists’ choice of  research problems. Yet the 
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where,  is one of  repeated  failure, and failure  at very  high  social cost. 
One is  not  surprised  that  a  large  fraction  of  the  profession  found  it 
worthwhile to attempt to provide the expertise presupposed by the exist- 
ing institutions. Similarly, it should surprise no one that others continued 
to question the viability of  these institutions and focused their work on 
the  design  of  alternative  frameworks  which  might  ultimately  replace 
them. 
Some Signs of  Change 
Events of  the current decade have brought about important changes in 
both public and professional confidence that economic expertise can de- 
liver  satisfactory  performance  within  the  framework  provided  by  the 
Employment and Federal Reserve acts.  They also provide examples of 
mechanisms, quite outside those established by this legislation, by which 
public opinion may be brought to bear on economic policy. In this sec- 
tion, I will briefly review a few of  these, beginning with what is surely 
the most important: the experience of  stagflation. 
In a  first  course  in  econometrics, students  discover  upward-sloping 
demand  curves  and  production  functions  which  impute  negative  pro- 
ductivity to capital. Students find these shocking experiences for which 
nothing in their theory  courses has prepared  them.  This is  a standard 
developmental crisis, like discovering that one’s parents are not perfect, 
and  experience  shows  that  if  it  occurs  in  a  reasonably  protected  and 
supportive environment, it can be survived and resolved with no lasting 
harm done. 
There is  a tendency  on the  part  of  many  economists  involved with 
Keynesian macroeconometric models to view the inflation and unemploy- 
ment rate forecast errors of  the 1970s in much the same terms. That is, 
the error itself  is not  denied  (this is hardly a possibility)  but is inter- 
preted as indicating nothing deeper than a neglect in controlling for some 
other factors which, when properly taken into account, reveal the original 
basic  structure to be  sound.  Thus we  show our econometrics students 
that by controlling for income and other variables and by reducing con- 
tamination  from  supply  side effects, the law of  demand is revealed  as 
clearly in the data as it is in the theory chapters of  their textbooks. 
I  have  argued  elsewhere,  most  recently  and  comprehensively  in 
collaboration  with  Thomas  Sargent  (Lucas 1975, Lucas  and  Sargent 
1978),  that these two cases are not at all analogous scientifically and that 
the misforecast of  the stagflation period is in fact a symptom of  much 
deeper  problems.  But  a  second,  even  clearer,  difference  in these two 
cases involves the  context in which the error occurred. The stagflation 
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est to professionals only. It occurred after the idea of  a stable inflation- 
unemployment trade-off had become accepted by the public generally as 
the central construct in discussing macroeconomic policy, and after wide 
public  acceptance of  the idea that movements  along the Phillips curve 
were technically within the control of  economic managers. Even if it were 
true  (and I believe it is  not)  that the sources of  this  error  are easily 
correctible and unlikely  to be repeated,  an enormous and far-reaching 
change has  already  taken place  in  the political  climate in which eco- 
nomic issues are discussed. 
Two  early  symptoms of  this  change  are Arthur  Laffer’s influential 
“Laffer curve” and Arthur Okun’s proposal for controlling inflation by a 
complex system of  taxes and subsidies on individual producers. Though 
both  can be supported by theory  of  sorts, provided  one uses the term 
“theory” with sufficient looseness, neither follows in any way from any 
widely  accepted  theoretical  framework,  neither  has  received  serious 
analysis by either proponents or critics, neither was even mentioned in 
the academic literature prior to the last year or so. 
This is the legacy of  stagflation:  a general loss of  confidence, whether 
scientifically warranted or not, in the formerly accepted framework guid- 
ing discretionary economic management. Since the demand for discre- 
tionary policies remains  strong, we  are seeing the proliferation of  new 
“solutions” to “short-run”  policy problems, defended by the promise of 
particular results but without basis in either theory or historical experi- 
ence. Given the entry costs into economic advising of  this sort, is there 
any real doubt what the future holds if  economists continue to view them- 
selves in a day-to-day management role? 
The  experience  of  stagflation  has,  then,  brought  about  important 
changes in the nature of  the postwar dialogue by means of  which policy- 
oriented  economists  attempt  to advance their  ideas  and to  satisfy the 
immediate  needs  of  economic  managers.  Recently,  there  have been  a 
number of  important developments occurring outside the now-traditional 
dialogue  among experts  and  economic managers, the most  striking of 
which  has  been  the  passage  of  California’s  Proposition  13,  limiting 
property taxes. Similar measures are under consideration in other states 
and there are analogous attempts underway to influence the federal bud- 
get at the constitutional level. 
The main  impetus for this “tax revolt”  is  surely dissatisfaction  over 
the general  level of  taxes  and government spending,  and not over the 
nature of  stabilization  policy.  Yet there  is  a clear and instructive con- 
nection  at the political  level.  In policies of  either type,  it is  evidently 
impossible for large numbers of  people  to form opinions and exercise 
influence at anything like the level of  detail at which legislators and eco- 
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it is clearly possible for people to impose limits on these technical dis- 
cussions, to bound  levels and rates of  change of  economic aggregates. 
Public opinion generally can do little to guide the exercise of  discretion- 
ary economic authority, but it has enormous potential to limit its scope. 
To this point I have stressed developments external to the economics 
profession, as opposed to internal, scientific developments, as influences 
on the way economists and noneconomists view the possibilities open to 
us for influencing economic policy. This choice of  emphasis reflects the 
opinion that public opinion generally  (or what used to be called “politi- 
cal feasibility”)  was far more important than were scientific considera- 
tions in  influencing professional  reaction to Friedman’s “Framework,” 
and that  this  situation  is  not  at  all  unusual.  (This observation  is not 
intended  as a lament:  there  is  little to be said for isolating economics 
from general contemporary social thought, and the consequences of  try- 
ing to do so tend to lead to reliance on sterile aesthetic criteria in guid- 
ing theoretical work.) 
Nevertheless, research based on the idea of  rational expectations has 
played a role in buttressing the case for thinking about policy, as Fried- 
man argued we should, as a problem in selecting stable, predictable pol- 
icy rules. The main argument turns out to be a positive  (as opposed to 
normative)  one:  our ability  as economists to predict  the responses  of 
agents  rests,  in  situations where  expectations about the future matter, 
on our understanding of  the stochastic environment agents believe them- 
selves to be operating in. In practice, this limits the class of  policies the 
consequences of  which  we  can hope  to assess in  advance  to policies 
generated by fixed, well understood, relatively permanent rules (or func- 
tions relating policy actions taken to the state of  the economy). 
I have developed the reasoning underlying this point elsewhere (Lucas 
1975). (Indeed, it follows from modern control-theoretic views of  policy 
evaluation  almost independently of  one’s views on expectations forma- 
tion.)  I have been impressed both with how noncontroversial it seems to 
be at a general level and with how widely ignored it continues to be at 
what some view as a “practical” level. One could ask for no better il- 
lustration of  this than the question motivating this session:  “Macroeco- 
nomic Policy, 1974/75 : What Should Have Been Done?” The question 
presupposes one of  two possible situations. The first is that households 
and firms in  1974/75 were describable by a fixed set of  decision rules, 
so that given any hypothetical selection of  1974/75 policies, one could 
simply read private-sector  responses off  these fixed curves to determine 
the response of  the economy as a  whole.  The second  situation under 
which this question is meaningful imagines firms and households attempt- 
ing to solve maximum problems involving not only current policy actions 
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policy  is  in  this  case  required  to understand  what  these  expectations 
about  the  future were,  and how  they  would  have  been  influenced by 
policy actions taken in 1974/75. 
Does anyone seriously argue that either of  these two situations pre- 
vails in fact? If  so, on what scientific ground? If  not, then why are we 
discussing this spuriously practical question at all? 
This seems to me by far the most fundamental sense in  which recent 
work  on  expectations  reinforces  the  viewpoint  toward  policy  which 
Friedman espoused in his 1948 paper. It emphasizes the fact that analy- 
sis of  policy which utilizes economics in a scientific way necessarily  in- 
volves choice  among alternative stable, predictable policy  rules,  infre- 
quently changed and then only after extensive professional  and general 
discussion, minimizing (though of  course never entirely eliminating) the 
role of  discretionary economic management. 
Though an agreement to focus on alternative policy rules would, in my 
view, be  the  major  step toward  restoring some degree of  rationality  to 
aggregative policy  discussions,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
particular  set of rules  advocated by Friedman would  dominate  others. 
On the one hand, several researchers have developed particular examples 
in which a 4% monetary growth rule is not dominated by monetary poli- 
cies which react to the state of  the economy  (Sargent and Wallace 1975, 
Barro  1976, Lucas  1972). Moreover, Sargent  (1976) has shown that 
one can find models of  this class which account very well for the behavior 
of  postwar, U.S. time series. On the other hand, John Taylor (1979) has 
developed an empirically implemented example in which monetary poli- 
cies which react  to the state of  the  system dominate  (in  a particular 
sense) a fixed monetary growth rule, though the latter is also shown, in 
this context, to dominate actual postwar policies. It seems clear at this 
point  that the choice among alternative sets of  policy rules will neces- 
sarily depend  on the  answer to difficult substantive questions involving 
the sources of  business cycles and the nature of  business cycle dynamics. 
Though there seems good reason to expect that the principle of  rational 
expectations will prove to  be a powerful tool in attacking these questions, 
it  is  clearly  not  sufficient  in  itself  to  dictate  the  nature  of  desirable 
countercyclical policies. 
The Case for the Friedman Program 
I began this paper with a brief  summary of  a variant of  Milton Fried- 
man’s well-known program for stabilization  policy,  and then  advanced 
some conjectures of  a  sociological nature  about why professional  dis- 
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reasons for believing that the terms of the discussion may now be shifting 
toward those which Friedman presupposed  in his  1948 paper. Yet be- 
yond an unelaborated  endorsement of  this program, I have devoted no 
space to its  defense or to an assessment of  its likely  consequences,  if 
adopted. 
To  an  extent which,  until  a  recent  rereading, I had forgotten,  this 
absence of  a clear defense and assessment also characterizes Friedman’s 
“Framework.”  There,  in  outlining his  strategy, Friedman  says that “I 
deliberately gave primary consideration to long term objectives. That is, 
I tried to design a framework that would be appropriate for a world in 
which cyclical movements other than those introduced by ‘bad’ monetary 
and fiscal arrangements, were of  no consequence.  I then  examined the 
resulting proposal to see how it would behave in respect to cyclical fluc- 
tuations. It behaves  surprisingly  well . . .”  (Friedman  1948 [1953, p. 
1331; italics mine). How well is this? “The proposal may not succeed in 
reducing cyclical fluctuations to tolerable proportions. . . . I do not see 
how  it  is  possible  to know  now  whether  this  is  the case”  (Friedman 
1948 [1953, p.  1561). 
The strategy, then, was to design a workable stabilization policy not 
dependent in any way on detailed knowledge of  business cycle dynamics. 
The program would (I  think on this there is no serious professional dis- 
agreement)  fully  protect  the  economy  against  sustained  inflation.  It 
would fuZly insure against the kind of  monetary collapse which was so 
important  a  factor  in  the  early  stages of  the Great  Depression  of  the 
1930s. It would entirely eliminate erratic monetary and fiscal shocks as 
independent  sources of  instability. Surely these are modest claims when 
compared with what can be accomplished via the application of  optimal 
control to purely hypothetical economies which provide  a complete de- 
scription of  business cycle dynamics. Yet as compared with actual per- 
formance in both the distant and recent past, their appeal is evident. 
In my view, recent research has added little to strengthen Friedman’s 
case, except  in  what  might be called  a negative  way. Friedman’s case 
was built largely on the presumption of  ignorance of  the nature of  busi- 
ness cycles. Many  of  us confused  the methodological advances in  eco- 
nomic dynamics that took place in the  1950s and  1960s with the sub- 
stantive narrowing of  this ignorance and consequently with the increasing 
feasibility  of  sophisticated,  reactive  countercyclical  policy.  We  have 
learned, I believe, that the list of  economic propositions sufficiently well 
grounded in theory and evidence to be useful in formulating aggregative 
policy is no longer now than it was in 1948. This situation is discourag- 
ing  and  also,  I think,  improvable, but  in  the meantime  we  should be 
grateful that, in the face of  our ignorance, we can still do “surprisingly 
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The Problem of  Transition 
From the point of  view of  those involved in economic management, 
the position that policy should be dictated by a set of  fixed rules seems at 
best  a partial response to the question: What should be done, now? To 
one with some responsibility for monetary policy in  1974, say, it is not 
very helpful to observe that monetary growth “should have” proceeded 
at a constant 4% rate for the 25 years preceding. Moreover, even if a 
move  toward  a policy  of  fixed  rules were  desired, it could be done in 
innumerable  ways, presumably with  different  consequences,  and a cri- 
terion based on long-run average performance offers no help in choosing 
among them. What advice, then, do advocates of  rules have to offer with 
respect to the policy decisions before us right now? 
This question does have a practical, men-of-affairs ring to it, but to my 
ears, this ring is entirely false. It is  a king-for-a-day  question which has 
no  real-world  counterpart  in  the decision  problems  actually faced by 
economic advisors. In the current system of  discretionary economic man- 
agement, no one or no small group has the job of  deciding what to do 
right now and into the middle distance with respect to the main aggrega- 
tive decision variables. None of  these managers is in a position to influ- 
ence the economy in any significant way toward a regime of  fixed, non- 
reactive policy rules.  They are simply reacting,  sometimes well,  some- 
times badly, to current difficulties, with no more capability of  affecting 
policy five years hence than of  affecting what happened five years before. 
Economists who pose this “What is to be done, today?”  question  as 
though  it  were  somehow  the  acid  test  of  economic  competence  are 
culture-bound  (or institution-bound)  to an extent they are probably not 
aware of. They are accepting as given the entirely unproved hypothesis 
that the fine-tuning exercise called for by the Employment Act is a de- 
sirable and feasible one. In criticizing Friedman’s  1948 proposal from 
this point  of  view, they  are  simply missing its  main point.  It is not a 
recipe for making the Employment Act “work” but rather a prediction 
that it cannot be made to work, and an outline of  an alternative set of 
policy arrangements. 
If one does try  to think  in  a politically  serious way  about possible 
scenarios leading to a fixed-rule regime, one is led to assign the primary 
roles to actors outside  the executive-central  bank system of  economic 
management. An encouraging example is provided by the House Concur- 
rent Resolution  133, requiring that the Federal Reserve Board announce 
monetary  growth  targets  in  advance and  account for  deviations after- 
ward.* One can imagine  this resolution  hardening  into legally binding 
4.  The substance  of  this resolution  became  an  amendment  to  the  Federal Re- 
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limits on monetary  growth  rates. A second  example is politically  less 
advanced:  movements  for  constitutional  limits  on  the federal  budget 
defi~it.~ 
In cases such as these, existing economic managers will not program 
a transition in any formal way, though they could certainly help to mini- 
mize disruption. But the inherent gradualism of  the legislative and con- 
stitutional processes will mean that any actual move toward fixed rules 
will  necessarily occur with ample advance warning and a great deal of 
prior adjustment on the part of  both government and the private sector. 
Analytical elegance will clearly not be one of the virtues of  such a transi- 
tion, but I see no reason to expect large economic disruption, at least 
by the sorry standards of  the past decade, to be an inevitable or even a 
likely consequence. 
Concluding Remarks 
As an  advice-giving profession  we  are in way  over  our  heads.  The 
Employment Act of 1946 placed heavy demands on the ability of  econ- 
omists to guide executive  authority granted  very broad powers.  In the 
early postwar  years,  and even through the sixties, it appeared that the 
framework provided  by  the Keynesian theory  of  income determination 
was, intelligently applied, capable of  meeting these demands. As  confi- 
dence has ebbed in our ability to use general monetary and fiscal policy 
to carry out the aims of  the Employment Act, professionals and nonpro- 
fessionals alike have turned to a wide variety of  complex, selective inter- 
ventions in  individual  markets.  Even to begin to assess the likely con- 
sequences of  these policies in anything like a scientific way is clearly well 
beyond the current limits of  our discipline. 
One response to this  situation is  to attempt  to deal with  this  ever 
broadening range of  management questions, working and hoping for ad- 
vances  sufficiently dramatic to enable us to regain the intellectual con- 
trol we thought we had in the sixties. If, as I believe to be the case, this 
will require  scientific improvements of  a fundamental  or basic nature, 
then this response is not likely to succeed. Basic research, to be success- 
ful, requires some degree of  control over the questions to be asked and 
the  results  that  can be delivered.  Though  stimulated  by  practical  de- 
mands, it is rarely carried out by those in an active managerial role, even 
at one remove. 
An alternative response is to attempt to make clear to our fellow citi- 
zens the questions that currently available expertise can hope to answer 
5. For  a  proposed  amendment  to  this  effect,  together  with  an  economic  and 
political  analysis, see Buchanan and Wagner  1977. 210  Robert E. Lucas 
successfully,  to  base  policy  recommendations  on  the  well-understood 
and empirically substantiated propositions of  monetary economics, dis- 
couragingly modest as these may be, and to make it as clear as possible 
that the main task of  monetary and fiscal policy is to provide a stable, 
predictable environment for the private sector of  the economy. 
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